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Dear Mr* Butler: 
Pursuant to Rule 24(j), Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, we 
wish to advise the Court of three (3) cases which have been decided 
since the briefs were filed in this case, and which are pertinent 
and significant thereto: 
1. Northern Plains v. Lujan, decided by the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals on May 9, 1989, which is pertinent to the standing 
arguments set forth in both Respondents1 and Intervenor' s briefs. 
2. ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, et al., decided by the United 
States Supreme Court on May 30, 1989, on appeal from the Arizona 
case cited in Respondent's Brief at page 11. 
3. DeBry v. Salt Lake County Board of Appeals, decided 
by the Utah ourt of Appeals on November 8, 1988, which is pertinent 
to the jurisdiction arguments set forth in both Respondents1 and 
Intervenor's briefs. 
Copies of these cases are enclosed for the consideration 
of the Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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Opinion by Judge Tevrizian 
SUMMARY 
Environmental Law/Jurisdiction 
Affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment in 
favor of appellees and dismissal of the complaint in the 
underlying action, the court held that an exchange of fee coal 
interests complied with National Environmental Policy Act 
requirements regarding adequate environmental impact 
analyses and conformed with the existing land use plan. 
Appellees Meridian Minerals and the United States 
Department of the Interior exchanged fee coal interests in 
McCone County, Montana. Prior to the exchange, each held 
alternating sections of land and mineral interests which were 
too small to mine feasibly. The exchange consolidated one 
tract for Interior and one for Meridian. Interior's appraisal off 
the exchange value showed that Interior received substantial 
excess value over what it deeded to Meridian. Appellants 
challenged the exchange alleging lack of compliance with 
equal value, land use planning and National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA) requirements. 
[1| A district court reviews an environmental impact state-
ment (EIS) under a rule of reason. If the EIS contains a rea-
sonably thorough discussion of the significant aspects of the 
probable environmental consequences, a court may not hold 
it insufficient on the basis of inconsequential, technical defi-
ciencies, f2| The NEPA does not require a separate analysis of 
alternatives with consequences indistinguishable from the 
action proposed. [3| Interior complied with the NEPA 
i although it did not produce a separate EIS addr^^^g nnly 
' this exchange. J4]Appcllants have neither a cause of action 
•/^nor standing to challenge Interior's grant of a land patent 
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f becauseappellantscannot assert anv legal property interest in , 
(^  the land in issucjSj Since appellants do not have standing to" 
challenge the equal value determination of Interior, the court 
does not have jurisdiction. (6| Merely alleging injury to status 
as a taxpayer does not confer standing because it does not 
create an interest in favor of appellants distinguishable from 
that of the general public. |7| Since appellants have not dem-
onstrated the requisite injury to assert standing, their appeal 
on these claims must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. (8| 
Interior reasonably interpreted the exchange to conform with 
the federal land use plan and no amendment to the plan was 
required by the exchange. 
COUNSEL 
James A. Patten, Billings, Montana, and David C. Masselli, 
Arlington, Virginia, for the plaintiffs-appellants. 
Myles E. Flint, Fred R. Disheroon, Jacques B. Gelin, and 
Dirk D. SneU Department of Justice, Washington, D.C:, for 
the defendant-appellee Secretary of the Interior. Guy R. Mar-
tin, William A. Gould, Donald G Baur, Perkins, Coie, Wash-
ington D.C. for the defendants-appellees Burlington 
Northern Inc. and Burlington Northern Railroad Co. 
Steven P. Quarles, Thomas R. Lundquist, Crowell & Moring, 
Washington, D.C, and Stephen H. Foster, Holland & Hart, 
Billings, Montana, for the defendant-appellee Meridian Min-
erals Co. 
OPINION 
TEVRIZIAN, District Judge: 
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants Northern Plains Resource Council, McCone 
Agricultural Protection Organization, and Montana Wildlife 
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Federation (collectively "NPRC") appeal from the decision 
of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of 
appellees Meridian Minerals Company, Burlington Northern 
Inc., and Burlington Northern Railroad Company, et al. 
("Companies") and Donald Hodel, Secretary of the Interior 
("Interior"), and dismissing the complaint in the underlying 
action. The underlying action is a challenge to an exchange of 
fee coal interests ("exchange") between Meridian Minerals 
Company ("Meridian") and the United States Department of 
the Interior consolidating ownership in the Circle West coal 
deposit in McCone County, Montana. The exchange was 
completed in September 1983. The district court's opinion is 
reported at 675 F.Supp. 1231 (D.Mont. 1987). 
An action against the exchange was also filed by the 
National Coal Association and the Mining and Reclamation 
Council of America ("NCA/MRC"). The district court par-
tially consolidated the two actions on the common issues 
regarding the legality of the exchange under Section 206 of 
the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 197^ 
("FLPMA") and the reasonableness of the public interest 
determination made by the Department of the Interior as 
required by the FLPMA. 675 F.Supp. at 1236. These are 
claims 1 through 4 of the NPRC suit (85-150-BLG-JFB) and 
claims 1 through 4 and 11 of the NCA/MARC suit 
(85-115-BLG-JFB). The unconsolidated claims 5 through 11 
concern compliance with equal value, land use planning and 
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 ("NEPA") 
requirements. This appeal is brought only as to the unconsoli-
dated claims. 
Meridian proposed the Circle West exchange in November 
1981. The Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") cpnducted 
a study of the proposal and released its environmental assess-
ment in December 1982. After requesting and considering 
written comments from the public, the BLM approved the 
exchange in May 1983. On September 8, 1983, Interior 
approved the BLM decision finding the fee interests appro-
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priate for exchange under Section 206 of the FLPMA, 43 
U.S.C. section 1716. This approval constituted final agency 
action by the Interior. 675 F.Supp. at 1234-35. 
Prior to the exchange, Meridian and Interior held land and 
mineral interests in alternating sections in a checkerboard 
pattern created by the terms of 19th century land grants. Each 
section is too small to support an independent and economi-
cally feasible coal mining operation. The exchange consoli-
dates one tract for Interior and one for Meridian by 
conveying to Interior all of Meridian's fee coal rights to the 
southern half of the Circle West deposit, and conveying to 
Meridian all of Interior's fee coal rights to the northern half 
of the Circle West deposit. Interior now has the consolidated 
southern tract for federal coal leasing, and Meridian now has 
the consolidated northern tract for development or leasing. 
675 F.Supp. at 1235. As a result of the exchange, Interior 
received 11,553 acres of fee coal containing approximately 
198.2 million tons of recoverable coal, and a one percen^roy-
alty on the coal produced from Meridian's post-excfcfange 
tract. Meridian received 7,887 acres of fee coal containing 
approximately 159.9 million tons of recoverable coal. Interi-
or's appraisal of the exchange value showed that Interior was 
receiving $7,785 million in excess value (without the royalty) 
or $13,278 million in excess value over what it deeded to 
Meridian (with the royalty). 675 F.Supp. at 1235, 1245. 
On appeal, appellants raise tlw following issues: 
t. Whether Section 102(2XQ of the NEPA requires 
preparation of a separate environmental impact 
statement on the exchange, or whether a prior draft 
and final environmental impact statement on fed-
eral regional coal leasing and an environmental 
assessment pertaining to the exchange satisfies the 
statutory requirement; 
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2. Whether the exchange complied with the "equal 
value" requirement of Section 206(b) of the 
FLPMA; and 
3. Whether Interior reasonably interpreted its 
exchange regulations in finding that the exchange 
conformed with the operative federal land use plan 
without requiring BLM to amend the plan prior to 
the exchange. 
ii DISCUSSION 
The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C 
section 1331. This court's jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. sec-
tion 1291. As will be explained below, neither the district 
court nor this court has proper jurisdiction over plaintiffs-
appellants' equal value claims. Plaintiffs' appeal is timely, 
having been filed on December 22, 1987, within 60 days of 
judgment as required by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 
4(aXD. 
A. Interior's reliance on the environmental assessment 
and regional coal leasing environmental impact state-
ments 
Appellants* claims on this issue involve Interior's interpre-
tation of regulations governing the preparation of environ-
mental impact analyses. Appellants contend that the 
applicable regulations require Interior to produce a separate 
environmental impact statement (MEISn) or to make a finding 
of no significant impact with regard to the exchange. Appel-
lants argue that Interior's reliance on an environmental 
assessment relating to the exchange which incorporates prior 
environmental impact statements on the impact of federal 
regional coal leasing is statutorily inadequate. The district 
court held that Interior complied with the environmental 
impact regulations, Section 102(2XQ of the NEPA 4? 
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U.S.C. section 4332(2Kc)f and that the exchange was proper. 
675 F.Supp. at 1247-49. We affirm. 
(I) As an initial matter we consider the applicable standard 
of review. Contrary to appellants* contention that NEPA 
issues are reviewed de novo, this court will only reverse a dis-
trict court's finding that an environmental impact statement 
is adequate if the district court's decision is based upon an 
erroneous legal standard or upon clearly erroneous findings of 
fact. Stop H-3 Association v. Dole, 740 F.2d 1442, 1460-62 
(9th Cir. 1984), cert, denied, 471 U.S. 1108 (1985). In turn, 
the district court reviews the adequacy of the EIS under a rule 
of reason: if the EIS contains a "reasonably thorough discus-
sion of the significant aspects of the probable environmental 
consequences", a reviewing court may not "fly speck" an EIS 
and hold it insufficient on the basis of inconsequential, tech-
nical deficiencies. Oregon Environmental Council v. Kunz-
man, 817 F.2d 484,492 (9th Cir. 1987). Thus, the EIS review 
standard is limited and decidedly deferential to the agency's 
expertise. NRDC v. Hodel 819 F.2d 927,929 (9th Cir. 1987). 
And where the review involves the interpretation of a regula-
tion, the agency's interpretation of its own regulation is to be 
given controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or 
inconsistent with the regulation. Marathon Oil Co. v. United 
States, 807 F.2d 759, 765 (9th Cir. 1986), cert, denied, 107 
S.Ct. 1593(1987). 
The land and mineral interests covered by the exchange are 
part of the Fort Union Coal Region. This Region is one of 
twelve coal supply regions, and is one of the six such regions 
containing significant amounts of federally owned coal. In 
September 1981, BLM's Montana State Director issued the 
Fort Union Coal Region Tract Summaries, which summa-
rized the consequences of leasing and developing federally 
owned coal in 24 tracts selected for further evaluation. Three 
of these 24 tracts are the Circle West I, II, and III tracts, which 
cover some but not all of the area involved in the instant Cir-
cle West exchange. 
4948 NORTHERN PLAINS V. LUJAN 
After Meridian proposed the exchange in December 1981, 
BLM's State Director issued a decision document in March 
1982 announcing that the exchange warranted further consid-
eration. In June 1982, BLM published its intent to pursue the 
exchange and to complete an environmental assessment. Fed. 
Reg. 24451, June 1982. In July 1982, BLM issued a compre-
hensive draft environmental impact statement on six alterna-
tive levels of coal leasing and development for the Fort Union 
Coal Region ("Fort Union DEIS"), including a specific dis-
cussion of the Circle West exchange. In September 1982, 
BLM issued an Air Quality Supplement, and in December 
1982 BLM issued an environmental assessment (uEAn), to 
which appellants submitted 41 pages of comments. In Febru-
ary 1983 BLM issued the Fort Union Final EIS, which incor-
porated by reference the DEIS and the Air Quality 
Supplement. 
In April 1983, BLM issued its "Decision Document/Lands 
Report" concerning the exchange. The document summa--
rized the previous, meetings, discussions and studies, andf 
expressly concluded that the exchange conformed to the Red-
water Management Framework Plan, the operative federal 
land use plan. BLM signed the **Record of Decision" on April 
26, 1983, and signed the exchange agreement on September 
8, 1983. The agreement noted that the value of government 
coal patented to Meridian was less than the value of the coal 
deeded to the United States, and thus a cash equalization pay-
ment was due to Meridian under Sectioa 206(b) of the 
FLPMA. Meridian waived such a payment a»d donated k as 
a gift to the United States pursuant to Section 20S of the 
FLPMA 41 U S C section 1715. 
121 Interior analyzed the site-specific impacts ot the 
exchange and the individual federal lease tracts in the Tract 
Summaries and the EA, which were incorporated by refer-
ence into the Fort Union EIS. The cumulative impects of 
these coal development actions on the Fort Union region and 
the significant cumulative site-specific impacts were also dis-
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cussed in the EIS. The EA analyzing the exchange must be 
read together with the Fort Union Regional draft and final 
EIS reports, and all supporting documentation taken as a 
whole. See Southern Oregon Citizens v. Clark, 720 F.2d 1475, 
1480 (9th Cir. 1983), cert, denied. 469 U.S. 1028 (1984). 
Sine* the NEPA does not require a separate analysis of alter-
natives with consequences indistinguishable from the action 
proposed, NRDC v. SEC 606 F.2d 1031, 1054 (D.C. Cir. 
1979), Interior's discussion of coal development by leasing 
also covers coal development by exchange. Indeed, we have 
previously held that Interior must consider related coal 
actions in a single EIS. Cody v. Morton, 527 F.2d 786, 795 
(9th Cir. 1975); see Kleppe v. Sierra Club, All U.S. 390, 410 
(1976). So long as the significant environmental impacts are 
addressed in the EIS at issue, a separate EIS on the exchange 
is not required. Columbia Basin Land Protection Association 
v. Schlesinger, 643 F.2d 585, 597 (9th Cir. 1981). Moreover, 
the NEPA does not require Interior to make site-specific anal-
ysis of the impacts of all possible development alternative^ 
Instead, the NEPA merely requires that Interior estimate tht 
impacts of a likely or probable development alternative; it 
need not prepare an EIS for speculative development alterna-
tives, so long as it reserves the right to preclude or prevent 
actions with unacceptable environmental consequences. See 
Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441, 1451 (9th Cir. 1988), cert, 
denied sub. nom Sun Exploration & Production Co. v. Lujan, 
57 U.S.L.W. 3550, US LEXIS 828, 103 L.Ed.2d 184 (Febru-
ary 21, 1989); Conservation Law Foundation v. GSA. 707 
F.2d 626, 634 (1st Cir. 1983). 
The EIS at issue considered the impacts of two alternative 
generic synthetic fuel plants. Since a federal coal lease creates 
no entitlement to construct an on-site fuel plant, and such a 
plant requires separate authorization under the FLPMA, 43 
U.S.C actions 1761-71, Interior could lawfully defer a 
detailed site-specific discussion of a proposed plant until a 
later EIS. Sierra Club v. FERC 754 F.2d 1506, 1509-10 (9th 
Cir. 1985); Village of False Pass v. Clark. 733 F.2d 605, 615 
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(9th Cir. 1984). This is exactly what the district court held 
here. 675 F.Supp. at 1249. Moreover, since any fuel plant 
would be subject to extensive state regulation, any 
site-specific discussion of a proposed plant in the Interior's 
EIS would, at this stage, be too speculative. See Enos v. 
Marsh. 769 F.2d 1363, 1373 (9th Cir. 1985). 
[31 The distnct court, atter considering the environmental 
impacts assessed by the Tract Summaries, the EA, and the 
h)it Union EIS, found that the agency was sufficiently 
informed of the development alternatives and the reasonably 
foreseeable significant environmental impacts that would 
result as a consequence of the exchange. 675 F.Supp. at 1248. 
The district court also found that since the specific impacts on 
the full exchange acreage were the same as the impacts 
addressed in the Tract Summaries incorporated into the EIS, 
it was reasonable not to prepare another EIS summarizing the 
same impacts on additional acreage. Id. We do not find tKat 
the district court'applied an erroneous legal standard or ttfat 
the court's holding was based upon clearly erroneous findings 
of fact. Stop H-3 Association v. Dole. 740 F.2d 1442, 1460-62 
(9th Cir. 1984), cert, denied. 471 U.S. 1108 (1985). Thus we 
affirm the district court's finding that Interior complied with 
the NEPA though it did not produce a separate EIS address-
ing only the Circle West exchange. 
Appellants also claim that Interior violated three Council 
on Environmental Quality regulations: 40 C.F.R. sections 
1502.4, 1502.2, and 1508.13. However, these alleged regula-
tory violations are raised for the first time on appeal. Absent 
exceptional circumstances, an issue not raised below will not 
be considered on appeal. United States v. Oregon. 769 F.2d 
1410, 1414 (9th Cir. 1985). No such circumstances are pres-
ent here, especially given the limited scope of review of the 
agency decision. Thus, these claims are barred. 
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B. Interiors finding that the exchange complied with the 
"equal value" requiremeni of Section 206(b) of the 
FLPMA, 43 U.S.C section 1716(b). 
Appellants raise three issues to challenge Interior's finding 
that the exchange complied with the equal value requirement 
of the FLPMA: (1) that Interior should have devalued the 
coal conveyed to the United States by Meridian because of a 
special wildlife protection provision applicable to federally 
held lands; (2) that Interior did not consider the higher min-
ing costs of the coal received by Interior, and (3) that Interior 
did not adequately explain the government's one percent roy-
alty interest on Meridian's coal. These arguments challenge 
Interior's compliance with the statutory requirements of the 
FLPMA and thus challenge the validity of the land patents 
deeded to Meridian and received by the United States. 
1. Appellants have not asserted a proper cause of action 
(4] Appellants do not have either a cause of action or stand-
ing to challenge interior's grant of a land patent because 
appellants do not and cannot assert any legal property inter-
est in the land at issue. Appellants seek only to invalidate the 
exchanged land titles. If a private cause of action does not 
exist in favor of a particular plaintiff, the standing issue need 
not even be addressed. National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. 
National Association of Railroad Passengers, 414 U.S. 45 3, 
456f 465 n. 13 (1974); Raypath, Inc. v. City of Anchorage. 544 
F.2d 1019,1021 (9th Cir. 1976). It is well established federal 
law that a plaintiff must establish his own entitlement to the 
land before the validity of a land patent may be challenged. 
See, e.g.. Fisher v. Rule. 248 U.S. 314, 318 (1919); St. Louis 
Smelting and Refining Co. v. Kemp. 104 U.S. 636,647 (1881); 
Donnelly v. United States. 850 F.2d 1313, 1320 (9th Cir. 
1988), cert, denied. 109 S.Ct. 878 (1989); Lee v. United States, 
809 F.2d 1406, 1410-11 (9th Cir. 1987), cert, denied. 108 
S.Ct. 772 (1988); Raypath. Inc.. supra, 544 F.2d at 1021; Kate 
v. United States. 489 F.2d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. 
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denied. 417 U.S. 915 (1974). We have succinctly stated who 
is a proper party to challenge the validity of a land patent or 
deed: 
{T]he validity of a deed or patent from the federal 
government may not be questioned in a suit brought 
by a third party against the grantee or patentee, [cita-
tions omitted]. Simply stated, a plaintiff in such a 
case has no cause of action. These holdings are sup-
ported by a sound reason. When public lands are 
conveyed to private individuals, a contractual rela-
tionship is created between the Government and the 
grantee; the integrity of such transactions could be 
upset if a grantee, by its use of the land, became 
monetarily liable to an amorphous class of third per-
sons Thus, even assuming that the grant to the 
[patentee] was somehow invalid, or that the [paten-
tee] violated the terms of the deed in some respect, 
appellants are in no position to complain. They are 
complete strangers to the title 
Raypath. Inc.. 544 F.2d at 1021 [footnote omitted]. 
Absent the requisite property interest, appellants have no 
private cause of action to challenge the grant of Meridian's 
land patent through their equal value claims. The district 
court did not expressly rule on this issue and decided the 
claims on the merits. However, appellants* lack of a private 
cause of action precludes their claim, and the district court's 
grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants-appellees 
on these claims was proper on this ground alone. 
2. Appellants lack standing to appeal the equal value 
determination 
[5] In addition, appellants do not have standing to chal-
lenge the equal value determination of Interior and thus nei-
ther the district court nor this court has jurisdiction to hear 
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that issue. Although the district court ruled that plain-
tiffs-appellants did have standing and ruled on the merits of 
their equal value claims, the standing issue is jurisdictional 
and must be addressed before this court can reach the merits 
of the claim. Fair v. Environmental Protection Agency, 795 
F.2d 851,853 (9th Cir. 1986). Since the standing issue goes to 
the district court's subject matter jurisdiction, it is a matter of 
law reviewable de novo. United States v. City of Twin Falls, 
Idaho, 806 F.2d 862, 866 (9th Cir. 1986), cert, denied. 107 
S.Ct. 3185(1987). 
(61 The district court found that plaintiffs-appellants had 
standing to sue, relying primarily on its decision in National 
Wildlife Federation v. Burford, 677 FSupp 1445, 1453-56 (D. 
Mont. 1985), appeal argued and submitted (February 1989) 
(9th Cir. No. 87-4375). 675 F.Supp. at 1241. There, the dis-
trict court held that plaintiffs who lived in impacted commu-
nities had standing to challenge allegedly underpriced coal 
leases because fewer federal funds would be available under 
the revenue sharing act to mitigate the adverse environmen-
tal and socioeconomic effects of the coal development. 677 F. 
Supp. at 1455-56; 30 U.S.C. sections 191, 201(aX3XQ. It is 
the environmental interest protected by 30 U.S.C. section 191 
which confers standing to sue upon appellants.-Merely alleg-
ing injury to their status as taxpayers (i.e., fewer federal funds 
from the coal development would result in higher taxes for 
appellants) does not confer standing because it does not 
create an interest in favor of appellants distinguishable from 
that of the general public. Sheldon v. Griffin. 174 F.2d 382, 
384 (9th Cir. 1949). 
(7] To assert standing to sue, appellants must show with 
reasonable precision the linkage between the challenged pol-
icy and the asserted injury. Wilderness Society v. Griles9 824 
F.2d 4, 12:17 (D.C Cir. 1987). Mere conjecture demonstrat-
ing potential injury is not sufficient. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 
U.S. 488, 494 (1974). Appellants have not alleged an injury 
related to Interior's equal value determination; they merely 
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state that Interior's decision might consequently cause the 
revenue loss appellants envision once coal development 
occurs. Appellants have failed to provide any declarations, 
affidavits, or other evidence that the federal tract was worth 
less after the exchange than it was before the exchange. Only 
if the federal holdings decreased in value would the federal 
revenue sharing funds be affected under 30 U.S.C section 
191. In fact, Interior found that the federal tract increased in 
value. Appellants put forward no evidence to contradict this 
finding. Thus, appellants have not demonstrated the requisite 
injury to assert standing, and their appeal on these claims 
must be dismissed on these jurisdictional grounds as well. 
C Interior's interpretation that the exchange conformed 
with the operative federal land use plan and did not 
require BLM to amend the existing Redwater Manage-
ment Framework Plan. 
Appellants contend that the exchange does not conform 
with the Redwater Management Framework Plan ("MFIf), 
the operative federal land use plan. Appellants contend that 
the MFP bars the exchange because that document only pro-
vides a land use plan for coal leasing, and does not expressly 
provide for an exchange. 
The applicable regulations are 43 C.F.R. sections 1601, 
2200.1(a), and 2200.2(b). To conform with the public land 
use plan, Ma resource management action shall be specifically 
provided for in the plan, or if specifically mentioned, shall be 
clearly consistent with the terms, conditions, and decisions of 
the approved plan or plan amendment." 43 C.F.R. 
1601.0-5(c). The exchange regulations provide that federal 
lands may be exchanged where "disposal is in conformance 
with the land use planning provisions contained in Subpart 
1601.- 43 C.F.R. section 2200. t(aX 1984). 
The MFP states that coal in the Circle West area could be 
considered for leasing, that licenses to mine coal there could 
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be issued, and that development could be allowed. The Deci-
sion Document/Lands Report relies on Decision 5.1 of the 
Rcdwater MFP to support its conclusion that BLM was not 
required to amend the existing MFP prior to the Circle West 
exchange. This decision was concurred in by the BLM State 
Director and by the Assistant Secretary of Interior in the Sep-
tember 1983 Decision Document on Protests. 
The district court found BLM's interpretation of the MFP, 
and Interior's subsequent determination that the exchange 
conformed with the MFP, to be a reasonable interpretation of 
its own regulations: 
At the heart of the Circle West exchange is the facili-
tation of coal development, the United States pos-
sessing a unified area so as to promote coal leasing. 
As stated in [Interior's] Decision Document/Lands 
Report: 
"Development" clearly indicates coal leas-
ing and * provision for site development. 
The coal exchange proposal is an alterna-
tive method to achieve both the lands and 
minerals objectives reached in the [Red-
water] plan. 
In short, the Court cannot say that the Circle West 
exchange is inconsistent or not otherwise in confor-
mance with the REdwater [sic] MFP. The Interior's 
reasonable interpretation that its own regulation 
was satisfied is conclusive. 
675 F.Supp. at 1247 (reference and citation omitted). 
[8] This factual determination can only be overturned on 
review if it is clearly erroneous. Vesey v. United States, 626 
F.2d 627, 629 (9th Cir. 1986). An agency's interpretation of 
its own regulations can only be overturned if "plainly 
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erroneous" or clearly inconsistent with the regulation. 
Marathon Oil Co. v. United States, 807 F.2d 759, 765 (9th 
Cir. 1986), cert, denied, 107 S.Ct. 1593 (1987). Appellants 
have not met this heavy burden. The exchange action need 
not be specifically mentioned, so long as it is clearly consis-
tent with the plan. 43 CF.R. section 1601.0-5. Though appel-
lants argue that the MFP was merely a preliminary decision, 
the MFP was in fact a final decision that coal mining and leas-
ing could occur. Finally, appellants mistakenly contend that 
the exchange must conform to Section 206 of FLPMA. That 
section requires only a public interest determination by Inte-
rior, and does not require Interior to issue a conforming land 
use plan. 43 U.S.C. section 1716. Thus, since appellants have 
not met their burden of demonstrating clear error by the dis-
trict court, we affirm the district court's finding that Interior 
reasonably interpreted the exchange to conform with the 
existing MFP, and that no amendment to the existing MFP 
was required prior to the exchange. 
D. Summary 
In sum, we find that the district court properly held that the 
Circle West exchange complied with the National Environ-
mental Policy Act requirements regarding adequate environ-
mental impact analyses. As to the equal value claim, 
appellants have no private cause of action to invalidate the 
Circle West exchange because they cannot assert any fee 
interest in the land at issue. Moreover, appellants lack stand-
ing to raise the equal value determination on the record pre-
sented on this appeal. Finally, the district court properly 
upheld the Department of the Interior's determination that 
the Circle West Exchange conformed with the existing land 
use plan. 
AFFIRMED. 
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^mong other things, the New Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act of 1910 
granted Arizona certain lands, excluding mineral lands, in trust for the 
support of public schools, and, in 5 28, provided that granted lands can-
not be sold or leased except upon compliance with certain conditions 
regarding advertising, bidding, and appraisal Arizona incorporated 
these conditions into Article 10 of its Constitution. After this Court 
held the original mineral land exclusion inapplicable to lands not known 
to be mineral at the time of the grant, Wyoming v United States, 255 
U S 489, Congress passed the Jones Act in 1927, extending the terms 
of the original grant to encompass all mineral lands The Enabling Act 
was also amended in 1936 and 1951 to clarify the procedures for leasmg 
granted lands for specific purposes The latter amendment expressly 
extinguished the §28 restrictions on leases of granted lands for the 
development of hydrocarbon substances Arizona's own law governing 
mineral leases on state lands does not require that the lands be adver-
tised, appraised, or leased for their full appraised value Ariz Rev 
Stat Ann § 27-234(B) Respondents, individual taxpayers and a state 
teachers association, brought a state-court suit against the State Land 
Department and others, seeking a declaration that § 27-234CB) is void on 
the ground that it does not comply with the provisions of § 28 or § 10 of 
the Arizona Constitution and requesting appropriate injunctive relief 
Petitioners, mineral lessees of state school lands, intervened as defend-
ants The trial court upheld the statute The State Supreme Court re-
versed, ruling that § 27-234(B) is "unconstitutional and invalid as it per-
tains to nonhydrocarbon mineral leases," and remanded the case for the 
trial court, vnter alia, to enter a judgment declaring § 27-234(B) invalid 
and to consider what further relief might be appropriate 
Held The judgment is affirmed 
155 Ariz 484, 747 P 2d 1183, affirmed 
JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to 
Parts I, II-A, II-B-2, II-C, III, and IV, concluding that 
1 This Court has jurisdiction to review the decision below 
(a) The Arizona Supreme Court issued a final judgment within the 
meaning of 28 U S C § 1257, despite the fact that it remanded the case 
for the trial court to determine appropriate further relief On remand, 
the trial court does not have before it any federal question whether past 
or current leases are valid, since respondents, on appeal, withdrew their 
request for an accounting and payment of sums due under past leases 
In addition, the trial court's further actions cannot affect the State 
Supreme Court's ruling that § 27-234(B) is invalid Thus, the judgment 
below comes within two of the exceptions to the finality requirement set 
out in Cox Broadcasting Corp v Cohen, 420 U S 469, 479, 480 (1) the 
federal issue is conclusive and the outcome of further proceedmgs is pre-
ordained, and (2) the federal questions that could come to this Court 
have been adjudicated by the state court, and the remaining issues will 
not give rise to any further federal question. 
(b) When a state court has issued a judgment interpreting federal 
law m a case m which the plaintiffs in the original action lacked standing 
to sue under the principles governing the federal courts, this Court may 
exercise its jurisdiction on certiorari if the state-court judgment causes 
direct, specific, and concrete injury to the parties who petition for this 
Court's review, as long as the requisites of an Article III case or con-
troversy are also met Here, petitioners possess standing to mvoke 
federal-court authority, since they have alleged that the decision below 
poses a serious and immediate threat to their leases' continuing validity, 
that such injury can be traced to the state court's erroneous interpreta-
tion of federal statutes, and that the injury can be redressed by a favor-
able decision in this Court Moreover, the requisites of a case or contro-
versy are met, since the parties remain adverse, and the judgment below 
altered tangible legal rights It would be inappropriate for this Court to 
vacate the judgment below on the ground that respondents lacked fed-
eral standing when they brought suit initially, and to remand for appro-
proceedings and have the effect of imposing federal standing require-
ments on the state courts whenever they adjudicate federal law issues, 
whereas established traditions and this Court's decisions recognize that 
state courts are not bound by Article III and yet have it within both 
their power and proper role to render binding judgments on federal-law 
issues, subject only to review by this Court It would also be inappro-
priate for this Court simply to order dismissal, leaving petitioners free to 
bring a declaratory judgment action in federal court raising the same 
claims, smce such a disposition would be likely to defeat the normal pre-
clusive effects of the state court's judgment on the ground that that 
court's conclusions about federal law were not subject to any federal re-
view Such a course would also represent an unnecessary partial inroad 
on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine's construction of § 1257 as barring di-
rect review m lower federal courts of a decision reached by the highest 
state court, District of Columbia Court of Appeals v Feldman, 460 
U S 462, Hooker v Fidelity Trust Co , 263 U S 413, particularly smce 
petitioners have already presented this Court with a case or controversy 
justiciable under federal standards 
(c) The decision below is not based on an adequate and mdependent 
state ground that would defeat review of the federal issue by this Court 
Although the state court's opinion mentioned the State Constitution sev-
eral times and directed the trial court to declare § 27-234(B) "unconstitu-
tional," its discussion focused solely on the federal statutes without ever 
mentioning the State Constitution apart from the Enabling Act More-
over, the state court explicitly considered itself bound by this Court's de-
cisions to adopt the plaintiffs' construction, and described Article 10 of 
the State Constitution as simply a "rescript" of § 28 of the Enabhng Act 
Thus, the opinion's references to the State Constitution merely reflect a 
holding which rests on the state court's interpretation of federal law, and 
do not divorce the state constitutional issue from the federal-law ques-
tions 
2 Section 27-234(B) is invalid as to nonhydrocarbon mineral leases 
smce the sale or lease of mineral lands granted to Arizona under the fed-
eral statutes must substantially conform to the mandatory requirements 
set out m the Enabhng Act 
(a) The grant of all lands under the Enabhng Act is conditioned, by 
the statute's clear and express language, upon the specific requirements 
for leasmg or selling those lands Petitioners' reliance on Neel v 
Barker, 27 N M 605, 204 P 205, for the proposition that smce mineral 
lands were originally exempt from the 1910 grant, the Enabhng Act's 
provisions do not apply to lands later determined to be mineral in nature, 
is flawed m two respects First, Neel did not take into account this 
Court's decision in Wyoming v United States, supm, that unknown min-
eral lands were within the grant Second, smce those lands were within 
the 1910 grant, they could not be regarded as unburdened by its manda-
tory conditions 
(b) The lands granted under the Jones Act are also subject to the 
Enabhng Act conditions To read that Act's § 1(a) language—which de-
clares that the grant of mineral lands thereunder "shall be of the same 
effect as prior grants" of nonmineral lands—as only assuring that title to 
the lands passed and vested in the same manner and with the same valid-
ity as titles under the Enabhng Act would render the language redun-
dant, smce the statute subsequently directly addresses the vestmg of ti-
tles Instead, that language achieved Congress' objective of extending 
the 1910 grant to mineral lands and confirming their title to the States 
Similarly, $ 1(b)—which states that though mineral lands may be sold, 
the rights to mine and remove the minerals themselves may only be 
leased "as the State legislature may direct"—is not blanket authority for 
States to lease minerals on whatever terms they wish as long as the 
leases' proceeds go to the schools Rather, it authorizes the States to 
regulate the methods by which mineral leases are made and to specify 
necessary or desirable additional terms, as long as the leases comply 
with the Enabhng Act's dispositional requirements 
(c) The 1936 and 1951 amendments to the Enabhng Act confirm that 
Congress never removed the original conditions contained in the Act 
In the amendments, Congress reiterated the formulation that lands 
could be leased for certain purposes as the state legislature "may direct" 
and as it "may prescribe " The 1936 Amendment did not alter the appli-
cation of S 28 to "all lands," and the 1951 Amendment, because it ex-
pressly extinguished the 828 restrictions as to hydrocarbon leases, but 
not as to other mineral leases, tends to confirm that the original restric-
tions remain m force as to nonhydrocarbon leases 
JUSTICE KENNEDY, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE STE-
VENS, and JUSTICE SCALIA, concluded m Part II-B-1 that the suit would 
have been dismissed at the outset if federal standing-to-sue rules were to 
apply, since neither respondent taxpayers nor respondent teachers asso-
ciation, the original plaintiffs, would have satisfied the requirements for 
bringing suit m federal court Respondent taxpayers' assertion that 
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thereby resulting in unnecessarily higher taxes," and respondent associ-
ation's allegations that the section "imposes an adverse economic impact" 
on its members and that teachers have a special interest in the quality of 
education in the State, do not assert the kind of particular, direct, and 
concrete personal injury that is necessary to confer standing to sue in 
federal courts. 
JUSTICE BRENNAN, joined by JUSTICE WHITE, JUSTICE MARSHALL, 
and JUSTICE BLACKMUN, agreeing that the question whether the state 
court plaintiffs had Article III standing is irrelevant when it is the de-
fendants below who invoke the federal courts' authority, concluded that 
it was unnecessary to reach the question of the standing of the plaintiffs 
below. 
KENNEDY, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the 
opinion of the Court with respect to Part I, in which all participating Mem-
bers joined, the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts II-A, II-R-2, 
II-C, III, and IV, in which BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, 
and STEVENS, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Part II-B-1, in 
which REHNQUIST, C. J., and STEVENS and SCAUA, JJ., joined. BREN-
NAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, 
in which WHITE, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined. REHNQUIST, 
C. J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which 
SCALIA, J., joined. O'CONNOR, J., took no part in the consideration or 
decision of the case. 
JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court, ex-
cept as to Part II-B-1. 
The ultimate question for our decision is whether Arizona's 
statute governing mineral leases on state lands is void be-
cause it does not conform with the federal laws that originally 
granted those lands from the United States to Arizona. 
First, however, there is a difficult question about our own ju-
risdiction, a matter which touches on essential aspects of the 
proper relation between state and federal courts. 
I 
Various individual taxpayers and the Arizona Education 
Association, which represents approximately 20,000 public 
school teachers throughout the State, brought suit in Arizona 
state court, seeking a declaration that the state statute gov-
erning mineral leases on state lands, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§27-234(B) (Supp. 1988), is void, and also seeking appropri-
ate injunctive relief. The state statute was challenged on 
the ground that it does not comply with the methods Con-
gress required the State to follow before it could lease or sell 
the lands granted from the United States in the New Mexico-
Arizona Enabling Act of 1910, 36 Stat. 557, and which are re-
peated in the Arizona Constitution. The suit was brought 
against the Arizona Land Department and others. 
ASARCO and other current mineral lessees of state school 
lands were permitted to intervene as defendants. Eventu-
ally the trial court certified the case as a defendant class ac-
tion under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 23. The defend-
ant class consisted of all present and future mineral lessees of 
state lands. 
The trial court upheld the statute on cross-motions for 
summary judgment, and respondents (the original plaintiffs) 
appealed. The Arizona Supreme Court reversed over the 
dissent of one justice, ruling that the statute is "unconstitu-
tional and invalid as it pertains to nonhydrocarbon mineral 
leases." Kadish v. Arizona State Land Dept., 155 Ariz. 484, 
498, 747 P. 2d 1183,1197 (1987). It remanded the case to the 
trial court with instructions to enter summary judgment for 
respondents, to enter a judgment declaring §27-234(B) 
invalid, and to consider what further relief, if any, might be 
appropriate. 
Various of the mineral lessees filed a petition for certiorari, 
and we granted review. 488 U. S. (1988). 
II 
Before we may undertake to consider whether the state 
legislation authorizing the leases is valid under federal law, 
we must rule on whether we have jurisdiction in the case. 
The parties and amid raise three jurisdictional issues, each 
of substance. We would be required, of course, to raise 
these matters on our own initiative if necessary, for our le-
gitimate exercise of judicial power is confined both by stat-
utes and by Article III of the Constitution. The issues here 
are: first, whether the judgment below is final; second, 
whether there is standing and an actual case or controversy 
that permits of a decision in federal court; and third, whether 
the decision below is unreviewable in this Court because it 
rests on an adequate and independent state ground. 
A 
The first jurisdictional question is whether the Arizona 
Supreme Court issued a final judgment in the case. It 
granted plaintiffs a declaratory judgment that the state law 
governing mineral leases is invalid, but then remanded the 
case for the trial court to determine "just what further relief 
is appropriate." 155 Ariz., at 498, 747 P. 2d, at 1197. The 
Solicitor General of the United States, participating as ami-
cus, asserts that the validity of existing leases remains at 
issue and that the trial court may yet decide to uphold the 
leases on the ground that they were made for "true value," 
and thus are in "substantial conformity" with the provisions 
of the Enabling Act, §28, 36 Stat. 574-575, even though the 
leasing procedures did not comply with every specific re-
quirement in the Act. Brief for United States as Amicus 
Curiae 10-14 (hereafter Brief for United States). 
If the assertion were correct, the judgment below would 
not yet be final within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. § 1257, and 
we would lack jurisdiction in the case. But it is not correct. 
Respondents originally sought a declaratory judgment that 
the state law is invalid, an injunction against further leases, 
and an accounting and payment of sums due under past 
leases; but they withdrew the last request on appeal to the 
Arizona Supreme Court. See Brief for Appellant in No. CV-
86-0238-T, Kadish v. Arizona State Land Dept (Ariz. Sup. 
Ct.), pp. 6, n. 3, 40. Thus, on remand the trial court does 
not have before it any federal question of whether past and 
current leases are valid because they were made in "substan-
tial conformity" with the terms of the Enabling Act. And, of 
course, the trial court's further actions cannot affect the Ari-
zona Supreme Court's ruling that § 27-234(B) is invalid. Ac-
cordingly, the judgment below comes within two of the ex-
ceptions to the finality requirement that were set out in Cox 
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469 (1975). Here 
"the federal issue is conclusive" and "the outcome of further 
proceedings preordained." Id., at 479; see also Duquesne 
Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U. S. (1989). In addition, 
the "federal questions that could come here have been ad-
judicated by the State court/" and the remaining issues, con-
trary to the Solicitor General's suggestion, will not give rise 
to any further federal question. Cox, supra, at 480, quoting 
Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U. S. 120, 127 
(1945). 
B 
The second jurisdictional issue is of some theoretical im-
port, though infrequent in occurrence. The question is 
whether, under federal standards, the case was nonjustici-
able at its outset because the original plaintiffs lacked stand-
ing to sue; and if so, whether we may examine justiciability at 
this stage because the Arizona courts heard the case and pro-
ceeded to judgment, a judgment! which causes concrete injury 
L.W 4 D I O ine vnuea ziaies L A W WILILIY o-au-o^ 
the parties who seek now for the first time to invoke the 
thority of the federal courts in the case. 
1 
The Solicitor General contends that the case should be dis-
ssed for lack of standing, since neither respondent taxpay-
s nor respondent teachers association, who were the origi-
1 plaintiffs, would have satisfied the requirements for 
inging suit in federal court at the outset. "In essence the 
estion of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have 
B court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular is-
es." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 498 (1975). Al-
DUgh standing in its outer dimensions is a prudential con-
pt to be shaped by the decisions of the courts as a matter of 
and judicial policy and subject to the control of Congress, 
its core it becomes a constitutional question; for standing 
its most basic aspect can be one of the controlling elements 
the definition of a case or controversy under Article III. 
*e Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for 
paration of Church and State, Inc., 454 U. S. 464, 471-476 
382); id., at 490-494 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). The 
aiding of respondents if they had filed suit in federal court 
the trial level may be resolved by applying well-settled 
inciples of federal law. 
The question whether taxpayers or citizens have a suffi-
snt personal stake to challenge laws of general application 
lere their own injury is not distinct from that suffered in 
neral by other taxpayers or citizens covers old and familiar 
ound. As an ordinary matter, suits premised on federal 
xpayer status are not cognizable in the federal courts be-
use a taxpayer's "interest in the moneys of the treasury 
. is shared with millions of others, is comparatively minute 
id indeterminable; and the effect upon future taxation, of 
ly payments out of the funds, so remote, fluctuating and un-
rtain, that no basis is afforded for [judicial intervention]." 
rothingham v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 487 (1923) (decided 
ith Massachusetts v. Mellon). 
We have indicated that the same conclusion may not hold 
r municipal taxpayers, if it has been shown that the "pecu-
ir relation of the corporate taxpayer to the [municipal] cor-
>ration" makes the taxpayer's interest in the application of 
unicipal revenues "direct and immediate." Frothingham, 
ipra, at 486-487, citing Crampton v. Zabriskie, 101 U. S. 
)l, 609 (1880). Yet we have likened state taxpayers to fed-
•al taxpayers, and thus we have refused to confer standing 
>on a state taxpayer absent a showing of "direct injury," pe-
tniary or otherwise. Doremus v. Bd. of Education of 
awthorne, 342 U. S. 429, 434 (1952). 
No such showing has been made in this case, and respond-
lt taxpayers do not allege any special circumstances or ex-
ptions that would confer standing upon them. Instead, 
iey have simply asserted that the Arizona statute governing 
ineral leases has "deprived the school trust funds of millions 
' dollars thereby resulting in unnecessarily higher taxes." 
omplaint, Kill. Even if the first part of that assertion 
ere correct, however, it is pure speculation whether the 
wsuit would result in any actual tax relief for respondents, 
they were to prevail, it is conceivable that more money 
ight be devoted to education; but since education in Arizona 
not financed solely from the school trust fund, Tr. of Oral 
rg. 8-10, the State might reduce its supplement from the 
meral funds to provide for other programs. The possibility 
lat taxpayers will receive any direct pecuniary relief from 
ds lawsuit is "remote, fluctuating and uncertain," as stated 
Frothingham, supra, and consequently the claimed injury 
not "likely to be redressed by a favorable decision." Vcti-
y Forge, supra, at 472. 
The same flaw defeats the claim that the teachers associa-
tion would have had standing to bring this suit originally in 
federal court. The association and its members contend that 
the state law "imposes an adverse economic impact" on them. 
Complaint, HIV. Yet even if invalidation of the state law 
would create increased revenue for the school trust funds in 
the near future, an issue much disputed here, the allegations 
of economic harm rest on the same hypothetical assumptions 
as do the taxpayer claims. If respondents prevailed and in-
creased revenues from state leases were available, maybe 
taxes would be reduced, or maybe the State would reduce 
support from other sources so that the money available for 
schools would be unchanged. Even if the State were to de-
vote more money to schools, it does not follow that there 
would be an increase in teacher salaries or benefits. These 
policy decisions might be made in different ways by the gov-
erning officials, depending on their perceptions of wise state 
fiscal policy and myriad other circumstances. Whether the 
association's claims of economic injury would be redressed by 
a favorable decision in this case depends on the unfettered 
choices made by independent actors not before the courts and 
whose exercise of broad and legitimate discretion the courts 
cannot presume either to control or to predict. We have 
much less confidence in concluding that relief is likely to fol-
low from a favorable decision here than we had in cases like 
Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737 (1984), and Simon v. Eastern 
Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U. S. 26 (1976), 
where standing was found to be lacking because the probable 
response of private individuals to explicit tax incentives was 
judged to be too uncertain to satisfy the redressability prong 
of federal standing requirements. 
Petitioners also argue that the "likelihood" of a redressable 
injury is increased once it is recognized that the claims of the 
taxpayers and the teachers association rest upon independent 
contingencies. The implication is that the Court should cu-
mulate the probabilities, in the event that plaintiffs prevail, 
of either the taxpayers receiving direct relief from the in-
creased revenues or the teachers receiving indirect economic 
benefit from higher funding for schools. Reply Brief for Pe-
titioners 14-15. This line of reasoning evokes two re-
sponses. First, it does not avoid the fundamental problem 
that the courts are unable to evaluate with any assurance the 
"likelihood" that decisions will be made a certain way by poli-
cymaking officials acting within their broad and legitimate 
discretion. Second, the doctrine of standing to sue is not a 
kind of gaming device that can be surmounted merely by ag-
gregating the allegations of different kinds of plaintiffs, each 
of whom may have claims that are remote or speculative 
taken by themselves. Instead, the basic inquiry, for each 
party seeking to invoke the authority of the federal courts, 
Warth, 422 U. S., at 498-499, is whether that party alleges 
personal mjury that is fairly traceable to the challenged con-
duct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief. Val-
ley Forge, 454 U. S., at 472. 
When the allegations of economic injury are put to one 
side, the claims made by both the taxpayers and the teachers 
association reduce to something like the association's conten-
tion that the state law undermines "the quality of education 
in Arizona." Complaint, 1 IV. We cannot say with any cer-
tainty that this contention is even likely to be correct. The 
claims raised here, moreover, are the kind of generalized 
grievances brought by concerned citizens that we have con-
sistently held are not cognizable in the federal courts. See 
Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U. S. 95, 111-112 (1983); Valley 
Forge, supra, at 482-487; Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 
727, 736-740 (1972); see also Schlesinger v. Reservists 
Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208 (1974); United States 
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v. ftiehardson, 418 U. S. 166 (1974). 
Our precedents demonstrate that a party may establish 
standing by raising claims of noneconomic injury, see, e. g., 
Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S. 91 
(1979); Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U. S. 
205 (1972), but claims of injury that are purely abstract, even 
if they might be understood to lead to "the psychological con-
sequence presumably produced by observation of conduct 
with which one disagrees," Valley Forge, supra, at 486, do 
not provide the kind of particular, direct, and concrete injury 
that is necessary to confer standing to sue in the federal 
courts. Although the members of the teachers association 
might argue that they have a special interest in the quality of 
education in Arizona, such a special interest does not alone 
confer federal standing. Cf. Sierra Club, supra, at 739-740. 
The argument does not succeed in distinguishing the mem-
bers in this regard from students, their parents, or various 
other citizens. 
Our review discloses no basis on which to find that re-
spondents would satisfy the requirements for federal stand-
ing articulated by our precedents. It follows that the suit 
would have been dismissed at the outset were the federal 
rule to apply. 
2 
But the state judiciary here chose a different path, as was 
their right, and took no account of federal standing rules in 
letting the case go to final judgment in the Arizona courts. 
That result properly follows from the allocation of authority 
in the federal system. We have recognized often that the 
constraints of Article III do not apply to state courts, and ac-
cordingly the state courts are not bound by the limitations of 
a case or controversy or other federal rules of justiciability 
even when they address issues of federal law, as when they 
are called upon to interpret the Constitution or, in this case, a 
federal statute. See, e. g., Pennell v. San Jose, 485 U. S. 1, 
8 (1988); Lyons, supra, at 113; Doremus, 342 U. S., at 434; 
Secretary of State of Md. v. J. H. Munson Co., 467 U. S. 
947, 971 (1984) (STEVENS, J., concurring); Bateman v. Ari-
zona, 429 U. S. 1302, 1305 (1976) (REHNQUIST, J., in cham-
bers); cf. Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew, 300 U. S. 
608, 612 (1937). 
Although the state courts are not bound to adhere to fed-
eral standing requirements, they possess the authority, ab-
sent a provision for exclusive federal jurisdiction, to render 
binding judicial decisions that rest on their own interpreta-
tions of federal law. See 28 U. S. C. § 1738; Grubb v. Public 
Utilities Commn. of Ohio, 281 U. S. 470 (1930). Indeed, in-
ferior federal courts are not required to exist under Article 
III, and the Supremacy Clause explicitly states that "the 
Judges in every State shall be bound" by federal law. U. S. 
Const., Art. VI, cl. 2. 
The question now arises whether a judgment rendered by 
the state courts in these circumstances can support jurisdic-
tion in this Court to review the case. At this juncture, peti-
tioners allege a specific injury stemming from the state-court 
decree, a decree which rests on principles of federal law. 
Petitioners insist that, as a result of the state-court judg-
ment, the case has taken on such definite shape that they are 
under a defined and specific legal obligation, one which 
causes them direct injury. 
We agree. Although respondents would not have had 
standing to commence suit in federal court based on the alle-
gations in the complaint, they are not the party attempting to 
invoke the federal judicial power. Instead it is petitioners, 
the defendants in the case and the losing parties below, who 
bring the case here and thus seek entry to the federal courts 
for the first time in the lawsuit. We determine that petition-
ers have standing to invoke the authority of a federal court 
and that this dispute now presents a justiciable case or con-
troversy for resolution here. 
Petitioners hold mineral leases that were granted under 
the state law the Arizona Supreme Court invalidated. Al-
though no accounting of sums due under these leases remains 
at issue in this particular case, it is undisputed that the deci-
sion to be reviewed poses a serious and immediate threat to 
the continuing validity of those leases by virtue of its holding 
that they were granted under improper procedures and an 
invahd law. The state proceedings ended in a declaratory 
judgment adverse to petitioners, an adjudication of legal 
rights which constitutes the kind of injury cognizable in this 
Court on review from the state courts. See, e. g., Nash-
ville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249, 261-265 
(1933). Petitioners are faced with "actual or threatened in-
jury" that is sufficiently "distinct and palpable" to support 
their standing to invoke the authority of a federal court. 
Warth, 422 U. S., at 500, 501. 
Petitioners contend before us that the Arizona Supreme 
Court's decision rests on an erroneous interpretation of fed-
eral statutes. They claim that the declaratory judgment 
sought and secured by respondents, along with the relief that 
may flow from that ruling, is invalid under federal law. If 
we were to agree with petitioners, our reversal of the deci-
sion below would remove its disabling effects upon them. In 
these circumstances, we conclude that petitioners meet each 
prong of the constitutional standing requirements. As the 
parties first invoking the authority of the federal courts, they 
have shown that they "personally ha[ve] suffered some actual 
or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal con-
duct of the [other party]. . . and that the injury 'fairly can be 
traced to the challenged action' and 'is likely to be redressed 
by a favorable decision.'" Valley Forge, 454 U. S., at 472 
(citations omitted). In addition, petitioners' standing to in-
voke the authority of this Court is not affected by any of the 
prudential limitations that have been identified in prior cases. 
Id., at 474-475. Indeed, the Solicitor General appears to rec-
ognize the force of these points. See Brief for United States 
20, n. 14 ("in light of the decision below, [petitioners] may 
now have standing" to invoke the authority of a federal 
court). 
We also conclude that "the record shows the existence of a 
genuine case or controversy essential to the exercise of the 
jurisdiction of this Court." Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U. S. 
44, 46 (1943). These parties remain adverse, and "valuable 
legal rights . . . will be directly affected to a specific and sub-
stantial degree by the decision of the question of law." Wal-
lace, 288 U. S., at 262. We are not confronted, certainly, 
with parties "attempting to secure an abstract determination 
by the Court of the validity of a statute . . . or a decision ad-
vising what the law would be on an uncertain or hypothetical 
state of facts," ibid., as might be the case, for example, if pe-
titioners were seeking review of an advisory opinion ren-
dered through specific mechanisms for obtaining a hypotheti-
cal ruling from a state court or other state official. The 
proceedings here were judicial in nature, and resulted in a 
final judgment altering tangible legal rights. This proceed-
ing constitutes a cognizable case or controversy. Cf. In re 
Summers, 325 U. S. 561, 568-569 (1945). 
Although petitioners satisfy the requirements of federal 
standing and present an actual case or controversy for deci-
sion here, the Solicitor General contends this showing is in-
sufficient to support our jurisdiction. He suggests that the 
appropriate order is dismissal, and that petitioners are then 
free "to bring a declaratory judgment action in federal court" 
raisins: these same claims. Brief for United States 20. n. 14. 
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etitioners counter that if the Court finds it cannot review 
le judgment on the merits, the proper course is to vacate 
le judgment below and remand for appropriate further pro-
sedings, Tr. of Oral Arg. 13-15, as we have done at least on 
)me occasions when a case becomes moot while it is pending 
n review from a state court. See, e. g.t DeFunis v. 
degaard, 416 U. S. 312, 320 (1974). Neither disposition is 
ppropriate here. 
If we were to vacate the judgment below on the ground 
lat respondents lacked federal standing when they brought 
nit initially, that disposition would render nugatory the en-
re proceedings in the state courts. The clear effect would 
e to impose federal standing requirements on the state 
ourts whenever they adjudicate issues of federal law, if 
iiose judgments are to be conclusive on the parties. That 
esult, however, would be contrary to established traditions 
nd to our prior decisions recognizing that the state courts 
re not bound by Article III and yet have it within both their 
ower and their proper role to render binding judgments on 
jsues of federal law, subject only to review by this Court. 
In addition, we doubt it would be a proper exercise of our 
uthority to vacate the state court's judgment in these cir-
umstances. It would be an unacceptable paradox to exer-
ise jurisdiction to confirm that we lack it and then to inter-
ere with a State's sovereign power by vacating a judgment 
endered within its own proper authority. This case is not 
ne committed to the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal 
ourts. We have no authority to grant a writ only to an-
lounce that, solely because we may not review a case, the 
tate court lacked power to decide it in the first instance.1 
If we were merely to dismiss this case and leave the judg-
lent below undisturbed, a different set of problems would 
nsue. Although the judgment of a state court on issues of 
>dera! law normally binds the parties in any future suit even 
'that suit is brought separately in federal court, we have oc-
asionally cautioned that such a judgment may well not bind 
he parties if the state court's conclusions about federal law 
rere not subject to any federal review. See, e. g.f 
)vremus, 342 U. S., at 434 ("we cannot accept . . . as the 
asis for conclusive disposition of an issue of federal law with-
ut review, any procedure which does not constitute" a case 
r controversy); Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U. S. 
51, 557 (1940) (this Court is responsible for assuring "that 
tate courts will not be the final arbiters of important issues 
inder the federal constitution"); Fidelity Nat. Bank & Trust 
:o. of Kansas City v. Swope, 27A U. S. 123, 130-131 (1927) 
1
 The Court's treatment of cases that become moot on review from the 
>wer federal courts, as distinct from those that become moot on review 
*om state courts, is illuminating on this point. In the former situation, 
be settled disposition of a case that has become entirely moot is for this 
tourt to "vacate the judgment below and remand with a direction to dis-
iiss.w United States v. MunMngwear, Inc., 840 U. S. 36,39 (1950). The 
ower to make that disposition is predicated on our "supervisory power 
ver the judgments of the lower federal courts," which "is a broad one." 
d., at 40. In the latter situation, on review of state judgments, the same 
isposition is not made. Traditionally, where the entire case had become 
noot, the Court vacated the judgment below and remanded for such fur-
her proceedings as the state court might deem appropriate, as in DeFunis 
'. Odegaard, 416 U. S. 312 (1974), since the state courts, not bound by 
Lrticle III, were free to dispose of the case in a variety of ways, including 
einstatement of the judgment. More recently, however, the regular 
practice in the latter situation has been to dismiss the case and leave the 
udgment of the state court undisturbed, which evinces a proper recogni-
ion that in the absence of any live case or controversy, we lack jurisdiction 
nd thus also the power to disturb the state court's judgment. See, e. g.t 
Kansas Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Corp. Commn. of Kan,, 481 U. S. 1044 
1987); Times-Picayune Bub. Corp. v. Schulingkamp, 420 U. S. 986 
1975). 
(proceeding in state court is res adjudicata if "the constitu-
tional rights asserted, or which might have been asserted in 
that proceeding, could eventually have been reviewed here"). 
The predominant interest promoted by this apparent excep-
tion to normal preclusion doctrines is to assure that the bind-
ing application of federal law is uniform and ultimately sub-
ject to control by this Court. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 
418 U. S. 24, 42, n. 13 (1974) (this Court may review a de-
claratory judgment granted by a state court, for "any other 
conclusion would unnecessarily permit a state court of last re-
sort, quite contrary to the intention of Congress in enacting 
28 U. S. C. § 1257, to invalidate state legislation on federal 
constitutional grounds without any possibility of state offi-
cials who were adversely affected by the decision seeking re-
view in this Court'*). 
Given the likelihood that dismissal in this case would defeat 
the normal preclusive effects of the state court's judgment, 
however, the effect again would be to impose federal stand-
ing requirements on a state court that sought to render a 
binding decision on issues of federal law. It also would deni-
grate the authority of the state courts by creating a peculiar 
anomaly in the normal channels of appellate review. The 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine interprets 28 U. S. C. § 1257 as or-
dinarily barring direct review in the lower federal courts of a 
decision reached by the highest state court, for such author-
ity is vested solely in this Court. District of Columbia 
Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U. S. 462 (1983); Atlantic 
Coast Line R. Co. v. Locomotive Engineers, 398 U. S. 281, 
296 (1970); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U. S. 413, 
415-416 (1923). The Solicitor General urges that the proper 
course for petitioners is to sue in federal trial court in order 
to readjudicate the very same issues that were determined in 
the state-court proceedings below. Brief for United States 
20, n. 14. That action, in essence, would be an attempt to 
obtain direct review of the Arizona Supreme Court's decision 
in the lower federal courts, and would represent a partial in-
road on Rooker-Feldman's construction of 28 U. S. C. §1257. 
For these reasons, we believe it would be inappropriate to 
dismiss the case at this stage.2 That disposition would come 
at the cost of much disrespect to state-court proceedings and 
judgments. It also would require petitioners to commence a 
new action in federal court to vindicate their rights under 
federal law, even though right now they present us with a 
case or controversy that is justiciable under federal stand-
ards. Cf. Wallace, 288 U. S., at 262-263 (a justiciable con-
troversy is not "any the less so because through a modified 
procedure appellant has been permitted to present it in the 
state courts''). Instead, we adopt the following rationale for 
'None of the precedents cited by the parties, and none that we have 
found, is squarely on point. In J. H. Munson, the original defendant 
brought an appeal to defend the constitutionality of a state statute declared 
unconstitutional by the state court, but the Court began by evaluating the 
standing of the original plaintiffs, as we do here, and found that they did 
meet the requirements for federal standing, which obviated any further in-
quiry. 467 U. S., at 954-959. The same is not true in this case. In Re-
vert v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp.t 463 U. S. 239 (1983), the Court found 
that the original plaintiff met the requirements imposed by Article III, and 
then refused to invoke the prudential limitation of jus tertii, at least in part 
so as to avoid any question of "leaving intact the state court's judgment in 
favor of [the original plaintiff], the purportedly improper representative of 
the third party's constitutional rights." Id., at 243. In Doremus v. Bd. of 
Education of Hawthorne, 342 U. S. 429 (1952), an appeal brought from 
state court by a losing taxpayer plaintiff was dismissed, because in that 
instance the party seeking to invoke the authority of the federal courts was 
found to lack standing, as would be true of the taxpayer plaintiffs in this 
case as well. Id., at 432-435. Yet here respondents are the injured par-
ties who seek to invoke the authority of this Court, and they meet the fed-
eral standing requirements. 
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out decision on this jurisdictional point: When a state court 
has issued a judgment in a case where plaintiffs in the origi-
nal action had no standing to sue under the principles govern-
ing the federal courts, we may exercise our jurisdiction on 
certiorari if the judgment of the state court causes direct, 
specific, and concrete injury to the parties who petition for 
our review, where the requisites of a case or controversy are 
also met. 
We are not unmindful of the paradox that would result if 
respondents (plaintiffs below) prevail on the merits, for then 
they will have succeeded in obtaining a federal determination 
here that was unavailable if the action had been filed initially 
in federal court. Nonetheless, although federal standing 
"often turns on the nature and source of the claim asserted/' 
it "in no way depends on the merits of the [claim]." Wartk, 
422 U. S., at 500. The rule we adopt is necessary in defer-
ence to the States and in response to the petitioning parties 
who seek this forum to redress a real and current injury 
stemming from the application of federal law. 
We therefore conclude that we may properly decide this 
case. Petitioners meet the requirements for federal stand-
ing under Valley Forge. Because they are the parties first 
invoking the authority of the federal courts in this case, and 
an actual case or controversy is before the Court, there is no 
jurisdictional bar to review. In these circumstances, and 
having already granted review, we believe the proper course 
is not to dismiss the case or to vacate the judgment below, 
but to undertake review of the federal issues on their merits. 
C 
The last threshold procedural issue concerns the possibility 
that the decision below rested on an adequate and independ-
ent state ground that would defeat review of the federal is-
sues by this Court. See, e. g., Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 
296 U. S. 207, 210 (1935). Here the state court mentioned 
the state constitution several times in its opinion but other-
wise relied exclusively on federal law, including an extended 
discussion of the applicable federal statutes and their legisla-
tive histories. 155 Ariz., at 486-487, 747 P. 2d, at 
1185-1196. In its conclusion, however, the Arizona 
Supreme Court directed the trial court "to enter a judgment 
declaring A. R. S. § 27-234 unconstitutional and invalid as it 
pertains to nonhydrocarbon mineral leases." Id., at 498, 747 
P. 2d, at 1197. 
We conclude that the opinion below is not based on an ade-
quate and independent state ground. Its discussion focuses 
solely on the federal statutes, and the state constitution is 
never mentioned on its own apart from the Enabling Act. 
The Arizona Supreme Court explicitly considered itself 
"bound to adopt the construction advanced by [plaintiffs]" 
based on the prior decisions of this Court, and described Arti-
cle 10 of the Arizona Constitution as simply a "rescript" of 
§28 of the Enabling Act. Id., at 495-496, 747 P. 2d, at 
1194-1195. In light of this description, the references to the 
Arizona Constitution simply reflect a holding which rests on 
the state court's interpretation of federal law. Although the 
Arizona Supreme Court was free to rest its holding on the 
state constitution as an independent ground, the decision 
below did not divorce the state constitutional issue from the 
questions of federal law. See Enterprise Irrigation Dist. v. 
Canal Co., 243 U. S. 157, 164 (1917); see also 155 Ariz., at 
495, 747 P. 2d, at 1194 ("The Enabling Act is the 'funda-
mental and paramount law* in Arizona," quoting Murphy v. 
State, 65 Ariz. 338, 345, 181 P. 2d 336, 340 (1947)). 
In sum, we do not lack jurisdiction to review the decision 
below. 
Ill 
The issue on the merits is whether Arizona may lease min-
eral lands granted from the United States without meeting 
the specific requirements imposed by federal statute. We 
begin with a more detailed review of the statutes in question. 
In 1910, Congress passed the New Mexico-Arizona En-
abling Act, 36 Stat. 557, which authorized the people of those 
territories to form state governments. Among its other pro-
visions, the Enabling Act granted Arizona certain lands 
within every township for the support of public schools. 
Congress provided, however, that the new State would hold 
those granted lands in trust and subject to the specific condi-
tions set out in § 28 of the Act, 36 Stat. 574-575. Under the 
conditions, the granted lands could not be sold or leased ex-
cept to the highest bidder at a public auction following notice 
by advertisements in two newspapers weekly for 10 weeks. 
Leases for a term of five years or less were exempt from the 
advertising requirement. Lands could not be sold or leased 
for less than the values set by an appraisal required by the 
statute. All proceeds derived from the lands would go to a 
permanent segregated fund, and interest, but not principal, 
was to be spent for support of public schools. Arizona incor-
porated those restrictions in its proposed constitution, Ariz. 
Const., Art. 10, and was admitted to the Union in 1912. 
The grant of lands in the Enabling Act specifically ex-
cluded mineral lands, §§6, 24, 36 Stat. 561-562, 572, but this 
gave rise to uncertainty about what are known as "unknown" 
mineral lands, those lands on which minerals were not discov-
ered until after the grant. In two subsequent decisions, this 
Court held that the exclusion applied only to lands known to 
be mineral at the time of the grant, and that unknown min-
eral lands were granted under the Act. Wyoming v. United 
States, 255 U. S. 489, 500-501 (1921); United States v. Sweet, 
245 U. S. 563, 572-573 (1918). These holdings in turn 
spawned numerous disputes over whether lands were known 
to be mineral at the time they were granted from the Federal 
Government. See, e. g., Work v. Braffet, 276 U. S. 560, 
561-563 (1928). Title to lands in many western States was in 
doubt, and the issue became more difficult to prove as the 
years passed. Accordingly, in 1927 Congress passed the 
Jones Act, 44 Stat. 1026, a brief statute that extended the 
terms of the original grant of lands in the western States to 
encompass mineral lands as well. Congress also has 
amended the Enabling Act twice, each time to clarify the pro-
cedures for leasing granted lands for specific purposes. See 
Act of June 5, 1936, ch. 517, 49 Stat. 1477; Act of June 2, 
1951, 65 Stat. 51. 
Arizona's own law governing the leasing of state mineral 
lands, enacted in 1941, requires every such lease to ''provide 
for payment to the state by the lessee of a royalty of five per 
cent of the net value of the minerals produced from the 
claim." Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §27-234(B) (Supp. 1988). 
But it does not require those lands to be advertised or ap-
praised before they are leased, and does not require the lands 
to be leased at their full appraised value. The lands in ques-
tion here were granted to Arizona either in 1910, by the 
terms of the Enabling Act itself, or in 1927, under the Jones 
Act. 
The grant of all lands under the Enabling Act is condi-
tioned, by the statute's clear language, upon the specified re-
quirements for leasing or selling those lands. The Act de-
clares that uall lands hereby granted . . . shall be by the said 
State held in trust, to be disposed of in whole or in part only 
in the manner as herein provided, . . . and that the natural 
products and money proceeds of any of said lands shall be 
subject to the same trusts as the lands producing the same." 
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i 28,36 Stat. 674, 675 (emphasis added). "Disposition of any 
of said lands, or of any money or thing of value directly or 
indirectly derived therefrom,... in any manner contrary to 
the provisions of this Act, shall be deemed a breach of trust." 
Any such disposition is expressly stated to be "null and void" 
unless "made in substantial conformity with the provisions of 
this Act." Ibid. And, again, the requirements set forth in 
the Act apply to "[a]ll lands, leaseholds, timber, and other 
products of land." Ibid. 
Petitioner cites Neel v. Barker, 27 N. M. 605, 204 P. 205 
(1922), as standing for the proposition that because mineral 
lands originally were exempted by Congress from the grant 
made in the Enabling Act, its provisions for the sale or lease 
of granted lands did not apply to those lands later determined 
to be mineral in nature. That proposition, never tested in a 
federal court, is flawed in two respects. First, in Wyoming 
v. United States, supra, decided the year before but not men-
tioned or discussed in Neel, this Court held that unknown 
mineral lands were within thegrant made by Congress. Sec-
ond, since those lands were granted to the States under the 
authority of the Enabling Act itself, they could not be re-
garded as unburdened by its mandatory conditions. In con-
sequence, the New Mexico Supreme Court erred in conclud-
ing that because "Congress did not intend to grant to the 
state any mineral lands . . . it follows that the state is not 
controlled nor restricted by said act in regard to leasing said 
lands for mineral purposes." 27 N. M., at 611, 204 P., at 
207. All the lands granted under the Act are granted sub-
ject to its conditions.1 
The lands granted under the Jones Act are subject to the 
same conditions. This very brief enactment was passed to 
address the continuing problems associated with the dual re-
gime, under which the adjudication of title to lands would de-
pend on whether they were known to be mineral at the time 
the Federal Government granted them. H. R. Rep. 
No. 1761, 69th Cong., 2d Sess., 2-3 (1927); S. Rep. No. 603, 
69th Cong., 1st Sess., 1-6 (1926). Indeed, its formal title 
was: "An Act Confirming in States and Territories title to 
lands granted by the United States in the aid of common or 
public schools." 44 Stat. 1026. The Jones Act resolved the 
problem of the dual regime by simply "extend[ing]" the prior 
grants of lands "to embrace numbered school sections mineral 
in character." 51, 44 Stat. 1026. The statute explicitly 
stated that "the grant of numbered mineral sections under 
this Act shall be of the same effect as prior grants for the 
numbered non-mineral sections." § 1(a), 44 Stat. 1026 (em-
phasis added). 
Petitioners make two points about the proper reading of 
this statute. First, they argue that the "same effect" lan-
guage was intended only to assure that the title to these 
lands passed and vested in the same manner and with the 
same validity as did the title to lands granted under the En-
abling Act, but said nothing about the conditions upon which 
those lands were granted. Second, they argue that the lan-
guage of § 1(b) of the Jones Act granted the States a broad 
authority to lease the mineral deposits in the newly granted 
'One possible distinction between mineral leases and the lease of lands 
for other purposes is that mineral rights can be difficult to appraise, which 
might make the Enabling Act's provisions less helpful m this setting. But 
this Court recognized long ago that such rights are subject to valuation in 
condemnation proceedings, and that whatever the difficulties may be in 
making such appraisals with complete accuracy, it does not defeat the ex-
istence of a "market value" m mineral rights, and it does not suffice as a 
reason to depart from the ordinary requirements that the law imposes on 
roch transactions. Montana R. Co. v. Warren, 187 U. S. 848, 852-853 
lands "by the State as the State legislature may direct," with 
"the proceeds of rentals and royalties therefrom to be utilized 
for the support or in aid of the common or public schools." 
44 Stat. 1026-1027. According to petitioners, therefore, the 
. Jones Act did not impose the same restrictions on mineral 
lands as did the Enabling Act; on the contrary, it explicitly 
repudiated any such restrictions on the newly granted lands. 
We do not agree with this reading of the Jones Act. First, 
the suggested interpretation of the "same effect" language 
would render that language redundant: the statute continues 
immediately with an additional clause that directly addresses 
the "vest[ing]" of "titles to such numbered mineral sections." 
§ 1(a), 44 Stat. 1026. Instead, we believe that the "same ef-
fect" language has independent meaning, and that it achieved 
Congress' stated objective of "extending]" the 1910 grants to 
encompass all mineral lands and of "[confirming" title to such 
lands in the States. 44 Stat. 1026. 
Second, the language of § Kb) does not undermine the con-
clusion that § 1(a) of the Jones Act extended the coverage of 
the Enabling Act's express restrictions as well as of its grant 
of lands. Section 1(b) says that though the mineral lands 
may be sold, the rights to mine and remove the minerals 
themselves are reserved to the State and may only be leased. 
Such leases may be undertaken "as the State legislature may 
direct." Petitioners would read § Kb) as containing the sole 
dispositional restrictions on the newly granted lands, and 
would read the latter passage as a blanket authority for the 
States to lease minerals on whatever terms they wish to set, 
as long as the proceeds of those leases go to the schools. 
This interpretation suffers from several defects. To begin 
with, it does not offer a comprehensive understanding of the 
statutory regime. Section 1(b) contains no dispositional re-
strictions on the sale or lease of the newly granted lands ex-
cept for the provision that the mineral rights on those lands 
are reserved to the State. If the "same effect" language in 
§ 1(a) does not extend the dispositional restrictions in the En-
abling Act to the lands granted in the Jones Act, then those 
lands are subject to no dispositional restrictions at all, though 
their mineral rights would be reserved. This is inconsistent 
with the view that the lands granted under the Jones Act are 
part of the school trust. Similarly, if the "as the State legis-
lature may direct" language is the blanket authority for 
which petitioners contend, it would allow minerals to be 
leased for little or no royalty, and thus would leave room for 
all the abuses that the establishment of a school trust was de-
signed to prevent. 
Perhaps the most fundamental defect of the interpretation 
urged by petitioners is that it would largely perpetuate the 
dual regime that Congress sought to eliminate by enacting 
the Jones Act. Under that interpretation, the restrictions in 
the Enabling Act would continue to apply to unknown min-
eral lands, but would not apply to known mineral lands. As 
a result, for example, some of the leases involved in this case 
might be proper, under the Jones Act, while others would be 
improper, under the Enabling Act, and the critical difference 
would rest on a determination, to be made at some future 
point, whether those lands were known to be mineral in 1910. 
This is surely not the resolution Congress intended when it 
passed this statute, and it is neither a sensible nor an appeal-
ing one.4 
AUnder the reading of the Jones Act we adopt, there may still be traces 
of the dual regime, though they are minimized. For example, it might be 
argued that "the right to prospect for, mine, and remove" minerals on un-
known mineral lands can be sold, whereas those same rights on known min-
eral lands cannot, since the Jones Act's prohibition m this regard is limited 
to those lands in "the additional grant made by this Act" 91(b), 44 Stat. 
1026. We need not decide m this case, however, whether that reading of 
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In addition, the "as the State legislature may direct" lan-
guage is not inconsistent with the express restrictions set 
forth in the Enabling Act. Given the preceding restrictions 
on the sale of minerals in § 1(b), Congress may have thought 
it necessary to emphasize that leases were subject to no such 
novel limitations; instead, the States retained all the author-
ity given under the conditional grants made in the Enabling 
Act. We thus agree with the court below that this language 
is properly viewed as authorizing the States to regulate the 
methods by which mineral leases are made and to specify any 
additional terms in those leases that are thought necessary or 
desirable, as long as the leases comply with the dispositional 
requirements set forth in the Enabling Act. See 155 Ariz., 
at 491,747 P. 2d, at 1190. But this language, in and of itself, 
does not dispense with those restrictions.1 
Both sides place a great deal of emphasis on the later 
amendments to the Enabling Act, which occurred in 1936 and 
1951. We think that the language of the original grants of 
these lands to Arizona is the decisive basis for decision here, 
and that subsequent amendments are at best only illustrative 
of how a later Congress read the original terms of the stat-
ute. Congress could not, for instance, grant lands to a State 
on certain specific conditions and then later, after the condi-
tions had been met and the lands vested, succeed in upsetting 
settled expectations through a belated effort to render those 
conditions more onerous. Congress could relax the condi-
tions upon which lands had been granted previously, of 
course, but we see nothing in the later amendments here to 
suggest that it has done so. Instead, the later amendments 
are wholly consistent with the view that Congress granted 
these lands in 1910 and 1927 subject to the conditions dis-
cussed previously, and has never removed those conditions.6 
In both the 1936 and the 1951 amendments, Congress reit-
erated the formulation that the lands could be leased for cer-
tain purposes as the state legislature "may direct," Act of 
June 5, 1936, ch. 517, 49 Stat. 1477, and as it "may pre-
scribe," Act of June 2, 1951, 65 Stat. 52. But the former 
amendment did not alter the application of §28 to "[a]ll lands 
. . . and other products of land," which remained in a passage 
which directly followed the "as the State legislature may di-
rect" language. And the latter amendment altered the 
application of § 28 in a maimer that tends to confirm the inter-
pretation adopted here: it expressly extinguished the ad-
vertising, bidding, and appraisal restrictions upon any leases 
of these lands "for the exploration, development, and produc-
tion of oil, gas, and other hydrocarbon substances," 65 Stat. 
52, though not upon leases for other purposes, such as min-
eral leases. Thus the subsequent history of these statutes, 
•In the wake of the enactment of the Jones Act in 1927, the experience 
of New Mexico is instructive as a contemporaneous reading of the statute. 
Concerned that the Act had undermined whatever basis there might have 
been for the decision in Neel v. Barker, 27 N. M. 606, 204 P. 205 (1922), 
the New Mexico government immediately petitioned Congress to authorize 
a state plebiscite to codify its holding as law. In response, Congress 
passed a joint resolution to that effect. Joint Resolution No. 7, ch. 28, 45 
Stat 58. The language of the resolution explicitly permitted New Mexico 
to waive the advertising, appraisal, and bidding requirements on all min-
eral leases. This explicit language was conspicuously absent from the 
Jones Act itself 
'The decision in Lassen v. Arizona Highway Dept, 885 U. S. 458 
(1967), has no bearing on the issues raised in this case. In Lassen, the 
Court held that Arizona was not obliged to follow the Enabling Act's spe-
cific requirements when it condemned land for use in its highway program, 
teeing "no need to read the Act to impose these restrictions on transfers in 
which the abuses they were intended to prevent are not likely to occur, and 
in which the trust may in another and more effective fashion be assured full 
compensation.n Id., at 464. Unlike public condemnation proceedings, 
however, the private sales and leases at issue here are precisely the kinds 
of transactions addressed by the federal statutes. Ibid. 
to the extent it indicates anything of significance, merely con-
firms that the original restrictions upon the sale or lease of 
mineral lands contained in the Enabling Act and the Jones 
Act remain undiminished in force. 
IV 
"The Court's concern for the integrity of the conditions im-
posed by the [Enabling Act] has long been evident." Alamo 
Land & Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 424 U. S. 295, 302 (1976). 
We conclude that the sale or lease of mineral lands granted to 
the State of Arizona under these federal statutes must sub-
stantially conform to the mandatory requirements set out in 
the Enabling Act. The court below was correct in declaring 
Ariz. Rev, Stat. Ann. §27-234(B) (Supp. 1988) invalid as to 
nonhydrocarbon mineral leases. The judgment of the Ari-
zona Supreme Court is 
Affirmed. 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR took no part in the consideration or 
decision of this case. 
JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE WHITE, JUSTICE 
MARSHALL, and JUSTICE BLACKMUN join, concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment. 
I join all but Part II-B-1 of the Court's opinion. I dis-
agree both with the view expressed in JUSTICE KENNEDY'S 
opinion that the plaintiffs below, particularly the Arizona 
Education Association, had no standing, and also with the de-
cision to reach that issue. The Court holds in Part II-B-2 
that the question whether the state-court plaintiffs had Arti-
cle III standing is irrelevant when it is the defendants below 
who now invoke the authority of the federal courts. The dis-
cussion of the standing question in Part II-B-1 is therefore 
unnecessary. 
CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom JUSTICE SCALIA 
joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
I join Part I of the Court's opinion and I also agree with 
JUSTICE KENNEDY'S conclusion in Part II-B-1 that respond-
ents, plaintiffs below, have failed to show the sort of "injury 
in fact" necessary to satisfy Article III standing require-
ments. Ante, at 4-8. This requirement 'tends to assure 
that the legal questions presented . . . will be resolved, not in 
the rarified atmosphere of a debating society, but in a con-
crete factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation of 
the consequences of judicial action." Valley Forge Christian 
College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and 
State, Inc., 454 U. S. 464, 472 (1982). For me, absence of 
standing disposes of this case and requires dismissal of the 
appeal. Doremus v. Board of Education of Hawtlwrne, 342 
U. S. 429 (1952). 
In Doremus, we dismissed an appeal from state court by 
taxpayers because they lacked standing. The Court now 
says that although the Doremus case is good law for plaintiffs 
who lack standing but lost in the state court on the merits of 
their federal claim, it is not good law for such plaintiffs who 
prevailed on the merits of their federal question in the state 
courts. The fact that such a rule has a very one-sided appli-
cation does not necessarily mean it is wrong, but it should at 
least require a very persuasive justification—a more persua-
sive one than the Court provides in its opinion. 
The Court justifies the result it reaches by saying that the 
state court judgment adverse to petitioners is itself a form of 
"injury" which supplies Article III standing. The difficulty 
M #»cr V/fltCCTl* iJIUICTJ) i I X o-ou-o^ 
with thfiC explanation is that petitioners—mineral lessees and 
defendants in the courts below—have always been able to 
show that a judgment adverse to their position would "in-
jure" them in a very real sense. The defect in the state 
court proceedings, so far as Article III standing is concerned, 
was not that the proceedings did not threaten to injure the 
petitioners, but that the operation and enforcement of the 
challenged statute did not injure plaintiffs-respondents. 
The subsequent proceedings in the state court have obviously 
not cured this defect. 
One could, of course, analogize the proceedings on certio-
rari in this Court to the commencement of what might be 
called the federal phase of the law suit, and say that for such 
purpose the petitioner is like the plaintiff filing a suit in the 
federal district court: therefore it is the petitioner's standing, 
not that of the respondents which should concern us at this 
stage of the litigation. Certainly some of our mootness cases 
following United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36 
[1950) indicate that where a judgment entered in a lower fed-
eral court no longer has a present effect on the parties, we 
mil not only not review the case but we will direct the 
vacation of the judgment of the lower courts. But while a 
present effect of the judgment on the parties may be a neces-
sary condition for continuing federal jurisdiction, I do not 
relieve that it is inevitably a sufficient condition. 
The Court's opinion makes much of the fact that "the 
•ecord shows the existence of a genuine case or controversy," 
mte, at 10, and that these parties remain adverse. . . ." 
foid. But most of our case law limiting federal standing does 
lot depend on any conclusion that the parties were not "ad-
verse" or that there was no "genuine case or controversy" in 
Jie lay sense of those terms. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 
190 (1975); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans 
United for Separation of Church and State, supra; DeFunis 
r. Odegaard, 416 U. S. 312 (1974); Linda R. S. v. Richard 
0.y 410 U. S. 614 (1973). In each of these cases the parties 
vere emphatically adverse to one another, and vigorously 
intended with one another as to how the lawsuit should be 
lecided. No one suggested that the cases were trumped-up, 
»r that they were "friendly suits." The shortcoming iiTeach 
»f them was the failure of the plaintiffs to establish actual in-
ury to themselves as a result of the governmental action 
rhich they sought to challenge on federal grounds. To have 
onsidered their cases on the merits would have required us 
NOTICE: These opinions are subject to formal revision before publication 
in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers arc requested 
to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, 
Washington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in 
order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to 
press. 
to decide the questions presented "in the rarified atmosphere 
of a debating society"; the plaintiffs had simply a generalized 
grievance about governmental action which they claim is pro-
hibited by federal statute or by the United States Constitu-
tion. And that is really all that the Court has before it in the 
present case. 
The Court is concerned with the fact that if it applies 
Doremus as sauce for the goose as well as for the gander 
state courts will remain free to decide important questions of 
federal statutory and constitutional law without the possibil-
ity of review in this Court. This is true, but I think it a 
rather unremarkable proposition. Some state courts render 
advisory decisions on federal law of no binding force even 
within the State. See, e. g., Mass. Const., Art. LXXXV 
(amending the Massachusetts Constitution to provide that: 
"Each branch of the legislature, as well as the governor or 
the council, shall have authority to require the opinions of the 
justices of the supreme judicial court, upon important ques-
tions of law, and upon solemn occasions"); Mich. Const., Art. 
3, § 8 ("Either house of the legislature or the governor may 
request the opinion of the supreme court on important ques-
tions of law upon solemn occasions as to the constitutionality 
of legislation after it has been enacted into law but before its 
effective date"). In each instance, the interpretation of fed-
eral law may affect the governance of the State and thereby 
make some people better off and some worse off. Yet none 
of these decisions of federal law are reviewable in this or any 
other federal court. I see no reason to fear that our dis-
missal of the present appeal would lead to a legal landscape in 
which we would no longer have the opportunity to review 
many important decisions on questions of federal law. 
Therefore I see no reason why this Court should bend its 
Article III jurisprudence out of shape to avoid a largely imag-
inary problem. 
DANIEL M. GRIBBON, Washington, D.C. (WILLIAM H. AL-
LEN, ELIZABETH V. FOOTE, DOUGLAS R. WILLIAMS, COV-
INGTON & BURLING, BURTON M. APKER, APKER, APKER 
& KURTZ P.C., HOWARD A. TWITTY, and TWITTY, SIEVW-
RIGHT & MILLS, on the briefs) for petitioners; DAVID S. BARON, 
Tucson, Ariz. (KEVIN J. LANIGAN, on the briefs) for respondents; 
CHRISTOPHER J. WRIGHT, Assistant to the Solicitor General 
(CHARLES FRIED, Sol. Gen., ROGER J. MARZULLA, Asst. 
Any. Gen., LAWRENCE G. WALLACE, Dpty. Sol. Gen., ROBERT 
T. KLARQUIST, and J. CAROL WILLIAMS, Justice Dept. attys., 
on the briefs) for U.S., as amicus curiae. 
NOTE: Where it is deemed desirable, a syllabus (headnote) will be 
released * * * at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no 
part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of 
Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit 
Lumber Co.. 200 U.S. 321, 337. 
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Robert J. DeBRY, Plaintiff, 
v. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY BOARD OF 
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Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Nov. 8, 1988. 
David E. Yocom, Paul Maughan (ar-
gued), Salt Lake Co. Atty.'s Office, Salt 
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Before DAVIDSON, BENCH and 
JACKSON, JJ. 
Appeal was taken from order of the 
County Board of Appeals. The Court of 
Appeals, Jackson, J., held that in the ab-
sence of statute specifically creating right 
to judicial review, Court of Appeals had no 
jurisdiction. 
Petition for review dismissed. 
1. Courts *»248 
Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals 
and the district court's appellate jurisdic-
tion must be provided by statute. Const. 
Art 8, § 5. 
2. Administrative Law and Procedure 
*»663, 681 
Statute giving the Court of Appeals 
appellate jurisdiction over final orders and 
decrees of state and local agencies or ap-
peals from the district court review of 
them defines the outermost limit of the 
Court of Appeals appellate jurisdiction and 
allows it to review agency decisions only 
when the legislature expressly authorizes a 
right of review. U.C.A.1953, 78-2a-3(2)(a). 
3. Administrative Law and Procedure 
*»663 
In the absence of specific statute creat-
ing right to judicial review of order of 
county board of appeals, Court of Appeals 
had no jurisdiction. U.C.A.1953, 78-2a-
8(2Xa). 
1. Cf. Utah Const art. Vm, § 5 ("Except for 
matters filed originally with the supreme court 
there shall be in all cases an appeal of right 
from the court of original jurisdiction to a court 
with appellate jurisdiction over the cause."). 
2. The statute was recently amended by 1988 
Utah Laws, ch. 73, § 1 (effective April 25, 1988). 
It now reads, in pertinent part 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Robert J. DeBry ("DeBry") filed a peti-
tion in this court seeking direct appellate 
review of a final order of the Salt Lake 
County Board of Appeals ("Board"). We 
dismiss for lack of iuriadictLoiL 
[1] DeBry proceeds from the premise 
that a direct "appeal" to some court of this 
state from a final order of a local govern-
mental agency is an inherent right How-
ever, the jurisdiction of the Court of Ap-
peals and the district court's appellate jur-
isdiction must be provided by statute. 
Utah Const, art VIII, § 5. Because there 
is no constitutional or other statutory pro-
vision creating a right to judicial review-
in either court—of final orders of local 
administratove agencies such as the 
Board,1 DeBry contends our general juris-
dictional statute must be interpreted as the 
statutory grant of a right of direct "ap-
peal" to this court We do not agree. 
[2,3] At the time DeBry's petition was 
filed, that statute provided: "The Court of 
Appeals lias appellate jurisdiction . . . over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees of state and 
local agencies or appeals from the district 
court review of them " Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2Xa) (1987).* This general 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate juris-
diction . . . over. 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting 
from formal adjudicative proceedings of state 
agencies or appeals from the district court 
review of informal adjudicative proceedings 
of the agencies ...; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of 
adjudicative proceedings of agencies of poiiti-
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statute defines the outermost limits of our 
appellate jurisdiction, allowing us to review 
agency decisions only when the legislature 
expressly authorizes a right of review. 
See State ex reL Dep't of Human Servs. v. 
Manfre, 102 N.M. 241, 693 P.2d 1273, 1275 
(Ct.App.1984). It is not a catchall provision 
authorizing us to review the orders of ev-
ery administrative agency for which there 
is no statute specifically creating a right to 
judicial review. In the absence of such a 
specific statute, we have no jurisdiction.3 
DeBry's petition is therefore dismissed. 
DAVIDSON and BENCH, JJ., 
concur. 
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Peter K. DEMENTAS, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
The ESTATE OF Jack TALLAS, By and 
Through FIRST SECURITY BANK, 
Personal Representative, Defendant 
and Respondent 
No. 860351-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Nov. 17, 1988. 
Claim was filed against decedent's es-
tate to recover on written agreement to 
make claimant an heir. The Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, David B. Dee, J., 
held for estate, and appeal was taken. The 
Court of Appeals, Orme, J., held that 
agreement was not enforceable contract in 
cal subdivisions of the state or other local 
agencies[.] 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (1988). 
3. Our determination that this court has no juris-
diction in this case does not leave parties with-
out a remedy for arbitrary or unlawful local 
agency action where there is no statute specifi-
cally authorizing judicial review. See, e,g., Utah 
R.Civ.P. 65B(b)(2); Davis County v. Clearfield 
that it constituted promise for past services 
performed gratuitously. 
Affirmed. 
1. Executors and Administrators e»227(l, 
2) 
Claim asserted against estate, reciting 
that estate was in debt to claimant for 
$50,000, based upon services rendered and 
acknowledgment by deceased, to which was 
attached a memorandum by deceased prom-
ising to pay money to claimant, gave suffi-
cient notice to estate of claimant's "account 
stated" claim, as well as his claim premised 
on quantum meruit theory; personal repre-
sentative had all information it needed to 
investigate claim and decide whether to pay 
it, and it was inconsequential that claim did 
not articulate particular legal theory upon 
which payment of claim would most appro-
priately be premised. U.C.A.1953, 75-1-
102(1), (2Kb), 75-3-804(lXa, b). 
2. Evidence 0=419(11) 
Extrinsic evidence was admissible to 
prove whether there was consideration for 
promise, even if parties had reduced their 
agreement to writing which appeared to be 
completely integrated agreement 
3. Contracts ^»61 
Any detriment no matter how economi-
cally inadequate will constitute sufficient 
consideration to support personal service 
contract 
4. Contracts *»79 
Written agreement to make claimant 
an heir in light of his past services to 
testator did not give rise to personal servic-
es contract enforceable by claimant against 
testator's estate where promise to pay was 
for past services performed gratuitously. 
City, 756 P.2d 704, 707 (Utah App.1988) (where 
there is no specific, statutorily prescribed meth-
od for judicial review of city council action, 
review is available by "traditional means" of 
extraordinary writ). See also Whiting v. Clay-
ton, 617 P.2d 362 (Utah 1980); Peatross v. Board 
of Comm'rs of Salt Lake County, 555 P.2d 281 
(Utah 1976). 
